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Acting Chief, D/T

5 May 1966

Chief, T/CST

~~T/CST Involvement~~ in Reporting and Analyzing Activities in  
Southeast Asia

1. Projects completed:

- a. CIA/RR CB 65-28, April 1965. Effects of the Bombing of Bridges on the North Vietnamese Economy and Logistics. S/NFD
- b. CIA/RR CB SC 65-15, 28 June 1965. Effects of the Bombing of the Transport System on the North Vietnamese Economy and Logistics. TS/NFD.
- c. S-1669, SC No. 11394/65, 8 November 1965. An Evaluation of Allied (US and GVN) Air Attacks Against North Vietnam. TS/NFD/Codeword. T/CST contributed an Estimate of Civilian Casualties in North Vietnam, based mainly on COMINT.
- d. SC No. 06810/66, 21 February 1966, TS/Codeword. Buildup of Vietnamese Communist Forces Continues After Resumption of Air Attacks. T/CST contributed sections on Activity in MR IV and Supply routes in Laos.
- e. OO.4771, Evaluation of the Rolling Thunder Program in North Vietnam. T/CST contributed on recuperability, development of alternate routes.
- f. OO.4566, The Effects of US/GVN Air Strikes in North Vietnam on the Economy. OHR Contribution to DIA's Overall Effects of US/GVN Air Strikes in North Vietnam. T/CST is responsible for costing the repair of bomb damage to all highway and rail bridges struck, on a monthly basis. Reports have been submitted monthly from September, 1965 to 2 May 1966.

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GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

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2. Projects underway:

- a. 00.4566, on a continuing basis, The Effects of US/GVN Air Strikes in North Vietnam on the Economy (Monthly)

3. Projects that need to be done:

- a. Estimates of recuperability on rail lines north of Hanoi versus repairs of rail lines south of Hanoi. Extent of Chinese involvement in reconstruction. 150 hours.
- b. Implications of the expansion of the Communist roadnet in the Laos Panhandle. Rates of construction, concealment efforts and improvements to the roadbed. 100 hours
- c. The North Vietnamese response to daily airstrikes on roads, bridges and chokepoints. Discussion of techniques, planning, resources and goals. Model of choices open to North Vietnamese at a bombed out bridge, such as game theory options to attain goals. 250 hours.
- d. Estimates of Bomb Damage in Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and South Vietnam and time needed to reconstruct in particular areas. 200 hours.
- e. Estimates of recuperability on roads throughout North Vietnam. Extent of planning, expertise and availability of resources. Amount of experience acquired and increased speed in repairs. Techniques used. 200 hours.

4. List of sources that should be tapped more fully.

a.

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- b. MACV Summaries give a blow by blow account of VC/PAVN incidents and attacks in South Vietnam that is not available elsewhere.

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5. Suggestions in general.

- a. Effect of Chinese Activity in North Vietnam upon the ability and the will of VC/PAVN to continue the battle.
- b. Estimates of support to North Vietnam obtained via Haiphong in ships of the free world. Comparison with the extent of Communist aid.
- c. Changing the ground war strategy in South Vietnam and consider Communist held sections of Laos and Cambodia as part of the ground war zone.
- d. Consider the changing role of VC to harassment and support as flankers to main thrust by PAVN troops.
- e. Present condition and improvements to US logistics system in South Vietnam.
- f. Present condition and improvements to Viet Cong logistics system in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

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